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Abstract: Policymakers pushing pension reforms have tended to justify changes on the basis that
they would make systems more sustainable by lowering future spending on pensions. This is a
rather narrow interpretation of sustainability that fails to consider that other fiscal programs may
need to accommodate the impact of reforms that reduce pension system adequacy. In this light,
this article argues that in order to correctly assess the sustainability of pension reforms, one needs
to adopt a more holistic framework that encapsulates the interaction between pension system goals
and constraints. In a number of countries, reforms focused solely on reducing future spending were
followed by reforms that restored generosity. A holistic approach to assess pension sustainability
could help limit this cycle of reform and increase trust in pension systems.
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1. Introduction
State pension systems are the cornerstones of modern welfare states in many senses. Holzmann
and Hinz [1] portrayed their rise as a reaction to the societal and economic changes of the nineteenth
century, with the informal arrangements that had existed in traditional agricultural communities being
replaced by arrangements that enabled industrial workers to smooth their income over their lifetime
and prevent poverty in old age. The first state income-transfer programs towards the elderly can
be traced to the late nineteenth century in Germany and Denmark [2]. In each of these countries,
the emphasis of the system differed. In Germany, the main focus was on ensuring that after reaching
a certain age, workers could stop working and still have an income that helped them maintain their
previous living standards. In Denmark, the program was a means-tested scheme for poor citizens
aged over 60, with a clear emphasis on poverty alleviation. Barr and Diamond [3] demonstrated that
income security in old age requires two instruments: a means to facilitate consumption-smoothing
over the life course and a means of insurance against the risk of old age poverty. The distinction in the
importance given to these two system goals has led to the rise of an extensive literature with several
taxonomies of pension systems, as described in Soede et al. [4].
Up to the 1970s, state pension systems were on the rise across the world. Only a small number of
mainly American economists, such as Feldstein [5], raised dissenting voices, and the concern tended
to be on whether state pension systems displaced private saving and lowered long-term economic
growth rather than on the size and scope of retirement income provision. All this changed in the 1980s
mainly due to two factors. On the one hand, the stagflation of the 1970s and the sharp international
recession of the 1980s had led to ballooning government deficits and significant balance of payments
crisis in many economies. Given that pensions had become either the largest or one of the largest
government spending programs in most countries, reforming them was seen as a way to address
these internal and external imbalances. On the other hand, policymakers woke up to the largely
unanticipated spectacular rise in longevity and decline in fertility that had characterized previous
decades. For instance, despite the long and respected actuarial tradition on which they were based,
Sustainability 2018, 10, 2891; doi:10.3390/su10082891 www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability
Sustainability 2018, 10, 2891 2 of 12
the population projections made by UK official demographers in the 1970s had assumed very little
mortality improvements going forward, and only a minor reduction in the birth rate [6]. Instead the
birth rate fell by 20%, while life expectancy at birth was 10% higher. As a result, the cost of state
pension schemes ended up much larger than previously anticipated.
Since the 1980s rather than trying to expand pension systems, policymakers have focused on
making them affordable in the face of these changed economic and demographic conditions. This
process was somewhat complicated by the intrusion of broader policy agendas related to the adoption
of more neoliberal economic policies as a means to address the economic decline of the 1970s. This
resulted in international institutions such as the World Bank pushing forward a reform model that
reduced the role of the state in retirement income provision and instead replaced it with private
pensions, preferably mandatory [7].
However, more recently the pace and, to an extent, the direction of pension reforms appears
to have changed, with some countries reversing the policies they adopted in the 1980s and 1990s.
Key examples in this regard are Argentina, Chile, and Hungary [8], which have moved away from sole
reliance on mandatory private personal pensions. The European Commission [9] and Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development [10] also note how since 2015 in many EU countries that
in the previous decade had cut back state pension generosity, the emphasis has shifted once more to
protect low income pensioners and, in some cases, there have been reversals of pension age changes
and the introduction of early access to benefits for some categories of workers. Grech [11] suggests that
this change in pace and direction is even more apparent when one compares the reforms conducted
after the 2008 financial crisis with the reforms carried out in the late 1990s and early 2000s, though he
argues it is unclear whether there is a temporary change or a permanent paradigm shift.
Many hypotheses have been put forward as to what are the fundamental drivers of the pension
reform process, and particularly on how these might have changed since the 2008 financial crisis.
In many cases, the emphasis has been on the political process involved. For instance, Armeanu [12]
emphasized that changes in Eastern Europe reflected the role of political parties, their ideological
orientation, and the process of coalition formation. Anderson [13] argued that the reforms in Sweden
reflected the presence and political importance of organized labor. Datz and Dancsi [14], on the
other hand, concluded that political dynamics and institutional considerations alone do not explain
the timing of certain decisions, and that short-term fiscal considerations played a key role. Maier,
De Graaf and Frericks [15] suggested that pension reforms (such as those pushing for more individual
benefits) reflect changes in social arrangements and more complex life courses. Vis, van Kersbergen
and Hylands [16] and Fedotenkov and Meijdam [17] noted that in advanced countries, despite a severe
fiscal and economic shock, the standard reaction has been to boost social programs, rather than to cut
back. This suggests that policymakers are moving somewhat beyond the narrow interpretation of
pension system sustainability that was adopted in previous decades, under which to be sustainable,
spending on pensions was expected to remain unchanged or even fall. Rather, as suggested by
Clements et al. [18] they are realizing there are potential feedback effects on overall fiscal outlays from
the impact of reductions in pension system generosity and that if reforms leave a system unable to
fulfill its goals, the possibility of policy reversals becomes quite probable.
This article argues that rather than viewing pension reform as a linear process with a clear
direction towards retrenchment over time, as proposed by Pierson [19], the process appears more
like a cycle when one looks at countries that have undergone long periods of pension reforms with
regular changes in direction. For instance, looking at the United Kingdom, the reforms conducted in
the 1980s and which many experts in the country, such as Blake [20], had judged as having made the
system sustainable, have been mostly undone and replaced by reforms that go in the opposite direction.
In this visualization of the reform process, while current economic, political and financial conditions
undoubtedly play a role, the reform process is driven by the extent previous reforms unbalanced
the trade-off between the achievement of the pension system’s goals and the pressures exerted by
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its constraints. For the cycle to stabilize and pension reforms to prove more sustainable, a holistic
approach needs to put in place whereby reformers focus on both system goals and constraints.
This approach is quite different from path dependence, as espoused in Pierson [21] as the latter
implies that history matters but in a way that changes in systems become ever more incremental and
follow the same direction. Subsequent literature, such as Andersen and Larsen [22] and Hinrichs and
Kangas [23] modified the static path dependence theory, introducing the concept of a martingale
motion, whereby a system departs from its previous past through incremental changes which
appear small at first but which eventually become irreversible and self-reinforcing. Conversely,
Sefton, van de Ven and Weale [24] argued that as the age profile of voters in a country becomes older,
the tendency will be to limit reforms in countries with generous systems while in those with more
residual systems, there would be pressure to improve benefits.
This article argues that the arguments on path dependency focus too much on institutional
arrangements, and that rather the reform process is constrained by the objectives, or expectations, of
the public and that whenever constraints force changes that reduce the latter, it is only a matter of time
before there is pressure for policymakers to restore a similar balance as before. As a result, the cycle of
continuous pension reform can only change if expectations are changed substantially or if the nature
of the constraints faced by the system changes. The recent evolution of pension reforms suggests
that citizens appear to be accepting a smaller role for income smoothing through the pension system,
while accepting that longevity requires longer effective working lives. The impact of these changes
on system goals and constraints could mean that the pace of the cycle of reforms could slow down,
but unless future reforms adopt a more holistic approach to assess pension system sustainability, it is
likely that the process of to-and-fro will continue.
2. Pension Reforms—Cyclical Tendency or Secular Trend
The policy discourse on pensions since the 1980s has tended to be dominated by a narrative of
crisis both in academic economic circles, via Disney [25], and in policy institutions, via the World
Bank [2]. For pensions to remain ‘sustainable’, only one reform direction—that of retrenchment—was
envisaged. This reflected the very negative change in opinion on the effectiveness of the
pay-as-you-go approach to financing pensions. The latter approach, which previous economists such as
Samuelson [26] had championed, was increasingly depicted as a sort of Ponzi scheme whereby earlier
generations of workers had lumbered future generations with a debt burden for expenditure outlays
they would not benefit from. Some economists, like Feldstein [5], also argued that the introduction
of pay-as-you-go had contributed to lower long-term economic growth as it led to reduced saving
and, in turn, to lower private investment. Since the ageing transition, in particular the retirement
of the Baby Boomer generation, was seen as inducing lower economic growth and reducing the
relative size of the contributor population, keeping pension policy unchanged was portrayed as
a recipe for disaster. In fact, substantial pension reforms ended up being one of the main policy
recommendations of international institutions, particularly moving emerging countries away from the
‘mistakes’ of retirement income provision systems prevalent in the developed world. The Independent
Evaluation Group [27] indicated that the World Bank, for instance, assisted 68 countries with reform of
their pension systems with more than 200 loans and other forms of support between 1984 and 2004,
with greater resources granted to countries developing multi-pillar systems.
The sustainability narrative underpinning the pension reform process was firmly rooted in the
concept of sustainability used in public economics. In this branch of economics, the theoretical
framework is based on a representative agent model where besides fulfilling an intertemporal budget
constraint, government also has to constantly fulfill a static budget constraint. This approach,
for instance adopted in Chalk and Hemming [28], implies that to be solvent the present value of
future surpluses must be higher than that of future deficits so that all government debt is repaid.
Caldarelli, Sefton and Kotlikoff [29], in fact, argued that the government’s intertemporal budget
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constraint meant that any bills left unpaid by current generations, such as the implicit pension debt of
public pension systems, must be paid by future generations.
Hauner, Leigh and Skaarup [30] presented the standard fiscal sustainability assessment of pension
policies made by international institutions—an approach that underpins for instance the assessments of
national policies made by the European Commission. The authors assess fiscal sustainability through
the ‘debt target primary gap’ and the ‘intertemporal primary gap’. The first measure computes the
fiscal adjustment required to achieve a given level of gross public debt-to-GDP by a certain year.
The second measure computes the fiscal position required so that public debt remains unchanged over
time. Given the projected expansion of pension spending and long-term reduction in economic growth,
combined with the large initial level of government debt, the policy advice emanating from these
models is retrenchment of the public pension system. For instance, Annicchiarico and Giammarioli [31]
pointed out that reducing benefits rather than raising taxes has a positive impact on economic growth
and accelerates the speed of debt adjustment towards this target.
International institutions have frequently pointed out public pensions as being a fundamental
stumbling block towards achieving long-term fiscal sustainability. In October 2006, the European
Commission [32] published a communication to the European Council and the European Parliament
where it noted that “in the coming decades, the size and age-structure of Europe’s population will
undergo dramatic demographic changes . . . this will make it difficult for Member States to maintain
sound and sustainable public finances in the long-term”. Similar statements have been made by entities
like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development. As a result, assessments of fiscal spending have tended to be the primary measure
of sustainability adopted by policymakers and researchers. Schneider [33], for example, determines
success in pension reform on the basis of the extent of the decrease in expected spending on public
pensions by 2050.
The European Commission, to give another practical example, carries out long-term forecasts
of public spending on pensions across all Member States every three years and these are used as an
indicator in its annual economic assessments of national policies. The definition of the indicator is
particularly important as it focuses on the change in pension spending as a percentage of the gross
domestic product over a period of time. This does not take into consideration further factors such as
the initial level of spending, whether the change is in line with demographic developments, or if it
reflects a slowdown in the gross domestic product rather than an acceleration in spending.
Howse [34] argued most governments are constrained when they are reforming pensions by
the belief that spending is already too high, thus increasing taxes or public borrowing to fund even
higher future spending is not an option. In this frame of mind, reducing future public spending,
by carving out part of the public scheme and pushing new workers into private schemes would make
the system more sustainable, as the size of future pension entitlements decline. The catch, of course,
is that spending for current generations of pensioners cannot be financed from contributions of current
workers, as these instead go into private pension schemes. When the financial crisis hit public finances,
this catch made many countries that had followed the World Bank advice in the 1990s and 2000s regret
their decision and revert back to pay-as-you-go financing.
While the case of the to-and-fro of Eastern European countries from pay-as-you-go pension
systems is interesting, it does not necessarily undermine the Pierson hypothesis of a secular trend of
welfare austerity. As a matter of fact, one could see it as a vindication of the path dependency theory.
Eastern European countries tried to move away from their longstanding institutional frameworks,
and at the first economic shock they were forced back. However, this would not mean a change from
the secular trend of reducing pension system generosity. In fact, many reformers in these countries
had sold the move to personal pensions as a way of ensuring that future pensioners would have better
benefits, as returns on private pensions (returns on financial assets) were seen as higher than the return
they would get from the pay-as-you-go system (the economic growth rate). The financial crisis, on the
other hand, confirmed the theoretical arguments against this supposed benefit made by Orszag and
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Stiglitz [35] and Barr [36] nearly a decade before. Moreover the financial crisis showed that contrary to
what had been conceived at the World Bank [2] when pressed for funds, many governments opted to
confiscate private pensions as a more politically acceptable option than reducing government spending.
To argue for a cycle in pension reforms, one requires more compelling cases: where the key
changes are not institutional arrangements but rather pressures arising directly from the effects of
past pension reforms. This raises a complication as most countries have adopted a very incremental
approach to pension reforms. Bonoli and Palier [37] in their review of reforms in European Union
countries, noted four stages of reform. Until the late 1980s, the only changes were limited to raising
contributions to finance funding shortfalls. This was followed by some moderate cuts in generosity;
particularly changes in indexation of benefits. While relatively minor, these reforms brought the future
of social security into the public debate. More radical reforms were conducted in the early 1990s, but
reforms were still not one-sided in terms of retrenchment. This stage also saw the first moves towards
funded private provision. Finally, the reforms conducted after the late 1990s were more radical with a
stronger push in favor of private pension funds, lowering of benefits, measures to stop early retirement
and increases in pension ages.
The authors emphasized that the more substantial reforms carried out since the late 1990s have
long phase-in periods, which ensure the large and increasing politically influential cohorts of baby
boomers, who will be retiring over the next two decades, will only be marginally affected by reforms.
For instance, the authors showed that only about one in seven of the current Italian electorate are
affected considerably by the major pension reforms. An added complication is that in some countries
which went for significant systemic reform, major elements of the reform, such as the reduction in
benefits induced by higher longevity, have been implemented haphazardly, according to Gronchi and
Nistico [38], or have been delayed in the aftermath of the financial crisis, as shown in Grech [11].
This leaves one with very few examples of countries where the pensioner population is already
feeling the effects of reforms and where there was pressure for change. The prime example is the
United Kingdom, where one can clearly see a recurring cycle of reform spurred by changes in pension
system outcomes. It is not the purpose of this article to describe in great detail the features of the
pension system of Great Britain and its reform over time, as there are ample studies on this topic,
such as Bozio, Crawford and Tetlow [39] and Pemberton, Thane, and Whiteside [40].
Figure 1 attempts to summarize the main changes that have occurred in the past fifty years.
These are grouped into three different sets of reforms. Starting from the left, one has the reforms
conducted in the 1970s, which aimed at improving generosity and enhance the coverage of the system.
Arguing against their cost, reformers in the 1980s undid these reforms, while in the 2000/10s when
the impact of the 1980s reforms became apparent, the latter were also undone returning the system to
something more in line with the concerns that had inspired the 1970s reforms.
In the 1970s, the British pension system was still going through its expansion phase with concerns
about its adequacy and the extent to which it was ensuring a good standard of living for pensioners.
The two main reforms were the introduction of indexation to earnings growth of the value of the Basic
State pension (BSP)—a flat-rate pension—whose value is determined by the number of contribution
years paid, and the introduction of the State Earnings-related pension (SERPS)—which contrary to BSP
was linked to the preretirement earnings of the contributor. In the 1980s, the Conservative government
moved the indexation of the BSP to inflation, while it pushed for the abolition of SERPS. When
this move met with political opposition, it instead introduced contracting-out, which meant that an
individual could forgo paying part of social security contributions if they instead contributed to a
private pension, either occupational or personal.
The impact of the 1980s reforms took time to be felt, but by the late 1990s the impact led to
considerable political pressure on the part of pensioners. McGuinness [41] showed that in the 1960s
and 1970s, the proportion of pensioners in relative low income had hovered between 35% and 40%.
By the mid-1980s, it had fallen to closer to 15% showing the positive impact of the pension reforms of
the 1970s. All of this changed in the late 1980s such that by the early 1990s the proportion was back to
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over 40%. This required significant intervention primarily through non-pension welfare benefits such
as income support, which gradually lowered the poverty rate. However, by the mid-1990s the poverty
rate among the UK’s pensioners was still above 30% or twice that among German pensioners or four
times that among Dutch ones. At the same time, contracting out had turned into a pension mis-selling
scandal with even the largest UK insurance firms (Bennett and Gabriel [42]) implicated in schemes that
led to worse pension outcomes for individuals. The resulting lack of trust, combined with subsequent
heavier regulation of the pension sector, meant that the take-up of private pensions nose-dived. It is
quite poignant that despite these two developments—namely very high pensioner poverty and the
decline in private pension saving—many UK economists (for instance, Dilnot, Disney, Johnson and
Whitehouse [43]) still thought their pension system was in a better state than other systems in Europe,
on account of its low level of spending and that improving the state pension was not an option.
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Figure 1. The cycle of pension reforms in the UK.
The Labour administration that came in power in the late 1990s, on the other hand, took a
diametrically opposite view and conducted considerable reforms, which are amply described in Hills
and Stewart [44]. Besides introducing a more generous system of means-tested benefits, known as
Pension Credit and a more progressive State Second pension (S2P), it set up an independent Pensions
Commission widely considered as one of the major policy successes of the UK government (see Rutter,
Marshall and Sims [45]). This Commission advocated the joining up of the flat-rate and earnings-related
state pensions into one more generous benefit, the reintroduction of earnings indexation of state
pensions and the auto-enrolment of workers into workplace pensions. The latter included the UK
government setting up a low-cost workplace pension scheme so that not all employers had to create
their own scheme, and also to act implicitly as a competitor to private schemes. The impact of the
Labour administration’s pension policies has been very pronounced, such that the pensioner poverty
rate nearly halved and is now at par with that in Germany.
The subsequent Coalition and Conservative administrations continued these policies, in contrast
to changes effected in other social welfare policies, such as working-age benefits (more details can
be found in Lupton, Hills, Stewart, Burchardt and Vizard [46]). The Coalition administration even
enhanced further the indexation of state pensions to include a triple lock that ensures a minimum
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increase of 2.5% even if both earnings growth and inflation are below this rate. The Department for
Work and Pensions [47] projects that dependence on the means-tested Pensions Credit should fall from
the current one-third of all pensioner households to around 3% by 2060 as a result of the more generous
new State pension (nSP). nSP should improve incomes for three-quarters of pensioners retiring over
the next fifteen years, with the impact remaining positive for half of those retiring later than 2050.
At the same time, the end of contracting out and the introduction of auto-enrolment appear to have
given a new lease of life to the United Kingdom’s occupational pension system. The Department for
Work and Pensions [48] indicates that while between 2006 and 2012 participation amongst private
sector employees had fallen from 51 to 42%, by 2016 it had risen to 73%.
The United Kingdom’s reform experience over the last fifty years shows a clear cyclical pattern
of reforms, with an initial focus on system goals turning into an emphasis on system constraints that
was maintained until the achievement of system goals substantially deteriorated. Then, despite there
being a pronounced financial and economic crisis, successive administrations across the political
spectrum maintained the course of reversing the direction of reforms and returning to a focus on the
achievement of system objectives. It is particularly noteworthy that policy continuity in other areas of
welfare policy is not at all evident, and in fact, the crisis resulted in significant austerity measures in
the United Kingdom for non-pensioners. Eurostat data indicate the proportion of the UK’s working
age population in material deprivation rose from under 4% in 2008 to close to 9% in 2013 and was still
at 6% in 2016, while it halved among the pensioner population to close to 1%.
The narrative of a secular trend in pension reform—halted temporarily but then resumed once the
fiscal situation requires it—does not seem to apply in the United Kingdom’s case. The story seems to
be that large-scale reductions in state pension generosity and an assumption that this will be made up
by private saving resulted in considerable policy reversals despite a major economic and fiscal crisis.
The next section will try to explain the source of this cyclical pattern in pension reform.
3. Optimizing the Trade-Off Between System Goals and Constraints to Make
Reforms Sustainable
The case of the United Kingdom shows that while economic and fiscal conditions, together with
political considerations, are undoubtedly important in driving the pension reform process, there is a
more underlying driver. It appears that if policymakers carry out reforms that undermine the trade-off
between the system’s goals and constraints, then these reforms do not tend to be long-lasting.
Before delving more in this hypothesis, it is pertinent to present another case of cycles in pension
reform. In the 1980s, Chile was the first country to adopt mandatory privately managed personal
pension accounts. While Chilean officials and economists in international institutions (see Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development [49] and Iglesias-Palau [50]) criticized some features
of the system, these were mainly of an operational nature and the system was seen as a model for
other countries. Yet the failing adequacy of the system resulted in considerable pressures for reform.
While maintaining the broad structure of the system, a number of important changes were made in
2008 (described in Mesa-Lago and Bertanou [51]), such as the introduction of a minimum pension
regardless of contribution history, and disability and survivors’ coverage together with credits for
mothers. The number of beneficiaries doubled while participation in the system rose. These reforms,
though introduced by a Socialist president, have been retained and even expanded on by her successor,
who incidentally is the brother of the architect of the 1980s privatization reform in Chile. The decision
to retain these reforms by a Conservative president comes despite the fact that economists from
international institutions (see Santoro [52]) have argued against them on the grounds that they are
expensive and will lower economic growth, and also despite the fact that the country’s international
rating has been downgraded because of high deficits.
Howse [34] argues that even if one accepts the argument that current levels of pension spending
are high enough and that one cannot respond to the ageing transition by raising taxation above
a certain level, this does not mean that the task of policymakers is simply to ensure that pension
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spending does not rise. For reforms to be sustainable, they need to ensure that people continue to have
what they consider to be an adequate income in retirement. Simply reducing the cost of providing
retirement income by moving part of it off-budget, as was done in many Eastern European and
Latin American countries, has proven to be unsustainable. Governments have had to step back in to
guarantee provision for low-income workers that were finding it difficult to save into private schemes.
This raises questions on how much policymakers can rely on non-mandatory funded pensions to
provide adequate pensioner poverty alleviation. In cases where mandatory provision is replaced
by nonmandatory schemes, it is likely that those most in need will end up with little provision,
requiring the introduction of other anti-poverty measures.
Policymakers need to consider the feedback effects from cuts in future pension spending.
Unless individuals accept these cuts and lower their consumption during retirement or accommodate
them by raising their non-pension income, the main effect of reforms could be to create pressures on
other areas of government spending, resulting in no real improvement in the fiscal balance. A classic
case from the United Kingdom is that while spending on pensions was reduced, government ended
up introducing a plethora of other benefits for the elderly, such as subsidies for energy, transport,
and medical expenses.
Holzmann and Hinz [1] is an example of the growing consensus of the need to adopt a multifaceted
approach to assess pension reform, based on the realization that the underlying needs currently
achieved by state pension systems cannot be simply swept away through reforms. The revised World
Bank position on pension reform, reflecting the recommendations of the Independent Evaluation
Group [27], is that pension systems should provide adequate, affordable, sustainable, and robust
retirement income in line with conditions in each individual country. In particular, benefits need
to be provided to most of the population, in a way that is sufficient to prevent old-age poverty in
addition to providing a reliable means to smooth lifetime consumption for the vast majority of the
population. The Social Protection Committee, an advisory policy committee for Employment and
Social Affairs Ministers of European Union Member States, has also adopted a broad concept of
sustainability whereby inadequate pensions are seen as a source of unsustainability, emphasizing that
if the social impact of reforms is not politically acceptable, reforms would be reversed. This concept of
balancing the trade-off between system goals and constraints, through which the aims of the system for
current beneficiaries continue to be achieved without putting excessive pressure on future generations
of workers or reducing too much their future benefits underpins the approach taken in European
Commission [9].
Figure 2 depicts the interdependence between the goals and constraints faced by pension systems.
On the left side one has the twin goals of the pension system. The need to ensure some degree of
income smoothing can be politically important. If a system is not seen as beneficial by the electoral
majority, political pressures for its reform can be difficult to resist. Similarly, if a system is not seen as
effective in alleviating poverty, the political pressures that led to the setting-up of transfers to elderly
people during the nineteenth century might re-emerge. The cases of the United Kingdom and Chile
show that this happens even when the affected numbers are still relatively small. The likelihood of it
continuing to happen in coming decades is higher as a larger share of eligible voters will be near or
above pension age.
The right side of Figure 2 shows the constraints of the pension system—namely the need for it to
be intergenerationally fair. A pension system should not be adequate simply in terms of the poverty
alleviation and consumption smoothing it provides to current pensioners, but rather it needs to provide
a fair deal to different generations. The standard conception of sustainability focuses on the need to
prevent having to impose ever-increasing contribution rates to finance pension transfers. However,
another source of political pressures, which is often ignored, is the desire of adjacent generations of
pensioners to enjoy similar living standards in retirement. If a generation of soon-to-be pensioners
believes its preceding generation had much larger pension transfers, it might pressure governments to
reverse reforms that have lowered its benefits and instead push cuts to subsequent generations.
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fiscal balance. A classic case from the United Kingdom is that while spending on pensions was 
reduced, government ended up introducing a plethora of other benefits for the elderly, such as 
subsidies for energy, transport, and medical expenses. 
Holzmann and Hinz [1] is an example of the growing consensus of the need to adopt a 
multifaceted approach to assess pension reform, based on the realization that the underlying needs 
currently achieved by state pension systems cannot be simply swept away through reforms. The 
revised World Bank position on pension reform, reflecting the recommendations of the Independent 
Evaluation Group [27], is that pension systems should provide adequate, affordable, sustainable, 
and robust retirement income in line with conditions in each individual country. In particular, 
benefits need to be provided to most of the population, in a way that is sufficient to prevent old-age 
poverty in addition to providing a reliable means to smooth lifetime consumption for the vast 
majority of the population. The Social Protection Committee, an advisory policy committee for 
Employment and Social Affairs Ministers of European Union Member States, has also adopted a 
broad concept of sustainability whereby inadequate pensions are seen as a source of 
unsustainability, emphasizing that if the social impact of reforms is not politically acceptable, 
reforms would be reversed. This concept of balancing the trade-off between system goals and 
constraints, through which the aims of the system for current beneficiaries continue to be achieved 
without putting excessive pressure on future generations of workers or reducing too much their 
future benefits underpins the approach taken in European Commission [9].  
Figure 2 depicts the interdependence between the goals and constraints faced by pension 
systems. On the left side one has the twin goals of the pension system. The need to ensure some 
degree of income smoothing can be politically important. If a system is not seen as beneficial by the 
electoral majority, political pressures for its reform can be difficult to resist. Similarly, if a system is 
not seen as effective in alleviating poverty, the political pressures that led to the setting-up of 
transfers to elderly people during the nineteenth century might re-emerge. The cases of the United 
Kingdom and Chile show that this happens even when the affected numbers are still relatively 
small. The likelihood of it continuing to happen in coming decades is higher as a larger share of 
eligible voters will be near or above pension age.  
 
Figure 2. The interaction between pension system goals and system constraints. 
 
System constraints: 
 
(i) Cost to workers 
(ii) Benefits for 
workers 
System Goals: 
 
(i) Poverty alleviation 
(ii) Income smoothing 
. i t ls s ste c strai ts.
4. Discussion
For many, the concept of pension reform conjures an inevitable process of retrenchment, either in
terms of reduced benefits or rising pension ages. The only issue is its pace, seen as dependent on
the current or projected state of the fiscal situation and on the strength of the political forces trying
to maintain the status quo. This article has argued instead that in cases where significant changes
to the pension system were made, and these resulted in much reduced achievement of system goals,
the reforms tended to be reversed or else countervailing measures taken to generate better outcomes
for pensioners. This suggests that the sustainability of pension reforms requires that pension adequacy
and fiscal affordability be treated as two sides of the same coin. While earlier papers, such as Holzmann
and Hinz [1], have argued this simply from a theoretical perspective, this article has sought to provide
a more empirical approach focusing on evidence from the United Kingdom and Chile, two of the
countries where the focus on fiscal considerations has been reversed in recent reforms. The article
argues that in future there could be other similar cases, particularly when the impact of reforms on
pension adequacy starts to be more strongly felt.
Eckardt [53] argues that fiscal considerations predominate because there have been few attempts to
develop prospective income indicators to evaluate the effects of reforms. Since then, this lack has been
gradually addressed (Zaidi and Grech [54]; Buslei et al. [55]; European Commission [9]). Policymakers
are starting to give due consideration to pension adequacy. Even in cases where benefit generosity
has been reduced considerably, minimum pensions have been strengthened. The prospective effect of
reforms on low-income households and on women is becoming an integral part of impact assessments.
That said, there continues to be a need to undertake a more holistic approach to pension
reform. For instance, simply raising pension ages while doing little to help older workers remain in
employment, such as providing assistance to boost their productivity, will not necessarily reduce the
burden on the public purse. Similarly, the Chilean case shows that providing incentives for people
to save in private pensions but doing little to ensure they provide good value for money, is a policy
with a short sell-by date. To limit the recurring cycle of pension reform, and make reforms sustainable,
policymakers need to ensure that the broader policy environment is conducive to a better achievement
of the pension system’s goals within its constraints.
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